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A ‘phishing email’ is an attempt to solicit personal or sensitive information from an 
unsuspecting user. Phishing emails currently represent a major threat to cybersecurity, and as 
such, researchers have begun to recognise the importance of identifying various individual 
differences that might predict phishing email susceptibility. The current study aimed to 
further understand individual differences and examine the relationship between an 
individual’s capacity for cue utilisation and levels of state/trait anxiety with phishing email 
susceptibility. Thirty-two participants completed a lab-based study where they were 
presented with a series of emails (phishing and genuine) and rated the extent to which they 
felt it was ‘okay’ to click on a link embedded within the email. Participants were then 
classified into typologies of cue utilisation and state/trait anxiety. While it was hypothesised 
that those categorised as having higher cue utilisation would be better able to discriminate 
between phishing and genuine emails, analyses did not support this prediction. However, it 
was found that those categorised as having higher levels of trait anxiety were less able to 
discriminate between phishing and genuine emails compared to their less anxious 
counterparts. The theoretical findings of the present study could help inform phishing 
education, training and awareness programs. 
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The Role of Cue Utilisation and Anxiety on Phishing Email Susceptibility 
Susceptibility to phishing emails is an emerging body of research in psychological 
literature. Previous studies have begun to investigate the strategies used by ‘phishers’ to 
exploit individuals and identify the individual differences (such as age and gender) which 
might make some users more susceptible to such attacks (Akbar, 2014; Butavicius, Parsons, 
Pattinson, & McCormac, 2016; Ferreira & Teles, 2019; Parsons, Butavicius, Delfabbro, & 
Lillie, 2019; Parsons et al., 2016). However, there has been a dearth of research that has 
examined the individual differences of cue utilisation and state/trait anxiety and their 
relationship with phishing email susceptibility. As phishing email research is still relatively 
young, the current study aims to investigate these specific individual differences to 
contribute to the understanding of susceptibility to phishing emails. A greater understanding 
of this domain will likely lead to more tailored awareness campaigns and/or training 
programs to aid in development of phishing email detection skills. 
Phishing Emails 
Commonly engineered via email, phishing is the fraudulent practice of mimicking 
trustworthy or legitimate institutions in an attempt to solicit personal or sensitive information 
from online users (Akbar, 2014; Parsons et al., 2019). Phishing emails often request the 
recipient to reveal personal information (e.g., passwords) and/or inadvertently provide access 
to their computer network (e.g., through the installation of malware) (Butavicius et al., 2016). 
This can be achieved by asking the recipient to click on a seemingly routine email attachment 
such as an invoice or receipt (Telstra Corporation Limited, 2019), or a link embedded within 
the email (Parsons et al., 2019).  
However, phishing attacks are now becoming more sophisticated, going beyond the 
usual indicators of visual deception and typographical errors, requiring recipients to pay 
attention to the plausibility of the message (Rajivan & Gonzalez, 2018). Consequently, 
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existing procedures and security tools which aim to detect these emails are becoming 
ineffective and potentially obsolete (Rajivan & Gonzalez, 2018). The Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) stated ‘phishing’ was the highest reported method of 
scamming in 2018, with scams committed via email costing AU$25.3 million in losses. More 
recently, a successful cyberattack on one of Australia’s leading universities, Australian 
Catholic University (ACU), saw phishers trick ACU staff with a falsified email prompting 
them to click on a link, or open an attachment related to an ACU login page. As a result, staff 
login details were comprised and used to successfully breach email accounts, calendars and 
back account details (Bastian, 2019). With the number of phishing emails predicted to 
increase in 2019 (Telstra Corporation Limited, 2019), there is an urgent need for future 
research to extend the understanding of how phishing emails can be recognised and who 
might be most vulnerable to these attacks.  
Social persuasion in phishing emails. Phishing attacks continue to be so successful 
as they usually contain an element of social persuasion to assist in user compliance (Akbar, 
2014; Rajivan & Gonzalez, 2018). Social persuasion is the scientific study of attitude or 
behaviour change due to real or imagined pressure (Guadagno, Muscanell, Rice, & Roberts, 
2013). Within psychology, the most widely accepted classification of social persuasion is 
Cialdini’s six principles of influence; authority, reciprocation, consistency, liking, social 
proof, and scarcity (Akbar, 2014; Cialdini, 2007). The authority principle is used to engender 
fear, to influence people to obey commands to avoid negative consequences. The 
reciprocation principle is used to make people feel obliged to repay an act of kindness, or a 
favour. Under the consistency principle, people become psychologically vested to commit to 
a decision they have made. The liking principle is used to create trust and compliance with 
others they find attractive or perceive as credible. The social proof principle is used to make 
individuals feel the need to model the behaviour of their peer group, or important others. 
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Finally, the scarcity principle is based upon reactance, whereby people respond to perceived 
shortages of scare items (Akbar, 2014). In the domain of phishing emails, phishers have used 
the authority principle to impersonate government organisations, such as the Australian Tax 
Office, to influence individuals to disclose personal details (Parsons et al., 2019). In an 
example of the scarcity principle, email phishers have masqueraded as delivery companies 
regarding a package that could not be picked up to encourage users to follow their requests 
(Parsons et al., 2019).  
These principles have been directly manipulated in real-world phishing research to 
evaluate how people’s susceptibility to social influence principles affects their response to 
phishing emails. In a novel, online study by Parsons et al. (2019), participants were presented 
with a series of genuine and phishing emails, each consisting of one social influence 
principle. The only indication of illegitimacy within each email was a link embedded in the 
content of the email. After reading each email, participants were asked to respond to the 
statement, ‘It is okay to click on the link in this email’ on a five-point Likert scale from 
1(Strongly disagree) to 5(Strongly agree). Susceptibility was measured based on performance 
of whether participants were more likely to click on the link when embedded in phishing 
emails compared to genuine emails. Results indicated that different persuasion strategies had 
different effects on the likelihood participants would click on either a genuine or phishing 
email. Therefore, these strategies should be considered in future phishing research.    
Individual Differences and Susceptibility to Phishing Emails  
In addition to examining the effects of social persuasion principles on phishing email 
susceptibility, Parsons et al. (2019) also examined the role of various individual differences. 
Age and percentage of time spent on a computer were significant contributors in people’s 
ability to detect phishing emails. Additionally, individuals with higher impulsivity were more 
likely to click on a phishing link embedded within an email, compared to a genuine link 
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(Parsons et al., 2019). In other research, the personality traits of conscientiousness (Lawson, 
Zielinska, Pearson, & Mayhorn, 2017), neuroticism and individualism (Butavicius et al., 
2017), have also been linked to an increased detection of phishing emails. These findings 
highlight that individual differences play a role in phishing susceptibility. However, the 
individual differences of cue utilisation and anxiety have yet to be considered. 
Cue utilisation. Conceptually, cues are thought to be unconscious associations in 
memory between features/s of an environment with an object/event (Wiggins, 2012). For 
example, as a result of extensive driving experience, it would be expected that motor vehicle 
drivers would have developed the cue association that a brake light on a car ahead (feature) 
usually means that the car ahead is stopping (event). This association is activated from long-
term memory (LTM), which is a relatively permanent and unlimited storage for information 
acquired from past experiences. Therefore, a driver with an extensive experience in this 
domain should have a reservoir of cue patterns that pertain to different events (Croskerry, 
2009). These patterns facilitate a more efficient process of interpretation, resulting in less 
deliberation (Wiggins, 2012).  
Cues and Brunswik’s Lens Model. Brunswik’s (1955) Lens Model suggests 
individuals base their judgements on probabilistic cues, or attributes to evaluate elements in 
the environment (Mosier & Kirlik, 2004). The model characterises judgements as both a facet 
of the environment, and the mediator within it (Mosier & Kirlik, 2004). To understand 
judgement, the model requires three important concepts; ecological validity, cue utilisation 
validity, and achievement (Yang & Thompson, 2016). Ecological validity refers to the 
correlation between the proximal cues and an ecological criterion. Cue utilisation validity 
refers to the correlation between the proximal cues and the individual’s judgements. 
Achievement refers to the correlation between the ecological criterion and the individual’s 
judgement (Yang & Thompson, 2016).  
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The characteristics pertaining to the Lens Model can help us understand how 
individuals detect phishing emails. It has been empirically recognised that users often identify 
phishing emails as having more spelling or grammatical errors, and less personalisation or 
links that appear legitimate (Parsons et al., 2016). Consistent with the Lens Model, 
individuals base their judgements on a “lens” of information (or weighted cues) to infer the 
true state of an email (Parsons et al., 2019; Wang, Herath, Chen, Vishwanath, & Rao, 2012). 
 For example, using the Lens Model (see Figure 1), the ‘true state’ represents how 
much a proximal cue (e.g., a suspicious link) is correlated with an actual phishing email (i.e., 
ecological validity). The ‘judged state’ represents the importance an individual weights the 
suspicious link as representative of the true state of a phishing email (i.e., cue utilisation 
validity). ‘Accuracy’ represents how well the judged state (e.g., I think this is a phishing 
email) correlates with the true state (i.e., achievement). However, the judged state may not 
always be the same as the true state (Yang & Thompson, 2016). Thus, judges who weight 
cues appropriately, are more likely to be successful than individuals who make trade-offs 
among cues (Mosier & Kirlik, 2004). Arguably, cue utilisation may be a necessary precursor 
for phishing email detection.
















Figure 1. The Lens Model. Adapted from “Capturing judgement strategies in risk assessments with improved quality of clinical information: 
How nurses’ strategies differ from the ecological model” by Yang, H., & Thompson, C. (2016). BMC Medical Informatics and Decision 
Making, 16(1
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System 1 and system 2 processing. 
Additional to the Lens Model, the application of cues when recognising developing 
situations can be explained by two fundamental approaches to reasoning, System 1 and 
System 2 processing. System 1 involves automatic and unconscious mental shortcuts to help 
understand situations (Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999). In uncertain and dynamic 
environments, System 1 facilitates the rapid assessment of information. On the other hand, 
System 2 involves slower, more systematic and analytical treatment of information to help 
understand situations (Croskerry, 2009). Therefore, individuals who do not possess the 
relevant cue associations stored in LTM, must engage in System 2 processing. For example, 
in a driving situation that requires a rapid response (e.g., a car switches lane unexpectedly), a 
less experienced driver who does not have relevant cues stored in LTM must engaged in 
System 2 processing to evaluate the situation. The driver may therefore crash due to the 
inability to engage in System 1. 
Cue utilisation and cognitive load. One of the advantages associated with the 
application of cues (and System 1 processing) is that their activation imposes relatively fewer 
demands on cognitive load (Wiggins, Brouwers, Davies, & Loveday, 2014). Cognitive load 
refers to “the total amount of mental activity imposed on working memory at an instance in 
time” (Brouwers, Wiggins, Griffin, Helton, & O’hare, 2017, p. 1503). A reduction in 
cognitive load means that there are more resources available in working memory, thereby 
enabling individuals to undertake complex tasks with relatively consistent levels of accuracy. 
For example, in a novel pattern recognition task using simulated train control, Brouwers et al. 
(2017) demonstrated that under increased workload conditions, those with higher levels of 
cue utilisation demonstrated reduced response latencies and increased accuracy during a 
novel rail control task. This study suggests that for participants with higher cue utilisation, 
the imposition of increased workload did not affect their performance during the novel task.  
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Drawing on the above concepts, individuals with a relatively higher capacity for cue 
utilisation are expected to more rapidly and accurately differentiate between a phishing and 
genuine email, compared to those with a relatively lower capacity for cue utilisation. 
Anxiety and decision-making performance. Currently, there is no research that has 
examined the relationship between state/trait anxiety and phishing email susceptibility. Of the 
literature that does exist, anxiety has been associated with detrimental effects on 
performance, particularly when tasks are demanding (Leon & Revelle, 1985). According to 
Leon and Revelle (1985), less anxious subjects allocate all their attentional resources to the 
designed task, whereas more anxious subjects divide their attention by allocating only part of 
their attentional resources to that task, and the remainder to self-relevant (i.e., task-irrelevant) 
concerns. 
This is can be understood by the Attentional Control Theory which postulates that 
anxious individuals have a processing bias towards threat-related information, and the 
negative interpretation of ambiguous stimuli (Hartley & Phelps, 2012). This has been 
observed across a variety of studies where anxious individuals recorded faster response times 
in detecting or identifying a threat-stimuli, and slower response times in reporting neutral 
information (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). This theory also asserts that 
anxious individuals have a tendency to negatively frame stimuli, even at the cost of missing 
potential gains (Hartley & Phelps, 2012). With this in mind, it would be expected that 
individuals with higher levels of anxiety would be better at identifying phishing emails due to 
their ability to engage in threat-related stimuli more readily than non-anxious individuals. 
However, by perceiving all ambiguous stimuli as a potential threat, anxious individuals might 
be more likely to perceive genuine emails as more threatening too. Arguably, this would 
suggest that individuals who are relatively more anxious might be less able to discriminate 
phishing from genuine emails compared to their less anxious counterparts. 
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State and trait anxiety. In an attempt to capture the multiple facets of anxiety, Cattell 
(1966) introduced two concepts of anxiety, state and trait, later elaborated by Spielberger 
(1983). State anxiety refers to “a transitory emotional response involving unpleasant feelings 
of tension and apprehensive thoughts” (Caci, Baylé, Dossios, Robert, & Boyer, 2003, p. 395). 
In contrast, trait anxiety refers to “individual differences in the likelihood that a person would 
experience state anxiety in a stressful situation” (Caci et al., 2003, p. 395). Studies have 
found that the impacts of anxiety on attention is an interactive function of both state and trait 
anxiety (Quigley, Nelson, Carriere, Smilek, & Purdon, 2012). Therefore, the relative roles of 
trait and state anxiety in attentional biases cannot be determined from studies that examine 
only trait or state, as both tend to confound each other (Quigley et al., 2012). As a result, it is 
unclear whether state and trait anxiety play a similar or different role in the context of 
phishing email susceptibility. 
The Current Study  
Aims and operationalisation. The aim of the current study was to understand how 
the individual differences of cue utilisation and state/trait anxiety relate to phishing email 
susceptibility. In line with the method used in Parsons et al. (2019), susceptibility was 
measured based on performance in a novel phishing email task. This task was lab-based and 
required participants to appraise a series of incoming emails which were created as either 
genuine or phishing. Each email was designed using a direct manipulation of one of 
Cialdini’s (2007) six social persuasion principles.  
Cue utilisation was operationalised using a software package (EXPERTise 2.0; 
Wiggins, Loveday, & Auton, 2015) which is customised to record performance in response 
to cues within the domain of cybersecurity. Performance on EXPERTise 2.0 classified 
participants into two ‘typologies’ representing participants with relatively higher and lower 
levels of cue utilisation. Anxiety was measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
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(Spielberger, 1983) classifying participants as having either high or low levels of state and 
trait anxiety. The NASA-Task Load Index was also administered as a subjective measure of 
perceived workload of the phishing email task. 
Hypotheses.  
H1: It was hypothesised that participants would be able to discriminate between 
genuine and phishing emails.  
H2: It was hypothesised that participants with higher levels of cue utilisation would 
have a higher capacity to discriminate between phishing emails and genuine emails, relative 
to those with lower levels of cue utilisation.  
H3: It was hypothesised that participants with higher levels of cue utilisation would 
perceive the phishing email task as less cognitive demanding, relative to those with lower 
levels of cue utilisation.  
H4a: It was hypothesised that participants with higher levels of trait anxiety would 
have a lower capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, relative to those 
with lower levels of trait anxiety. 
H4b: It was hypothesised that participants with higher levels of state anxiety would 
have a lower capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, relative to those 













Thirty-two participants were recruited for the current study (11 males, 21 females). 
Fifteen participants were recruited from the general public using snowball and convenience 
sampling via social media, word of mouth and advertisement flyers (see Appendix A). 
Additionally, seventeen first-year psychology students from the University of Adelaide were 
recruited using SONA Systems, the University’s online participant pool. Participants were 
aged between 18 and 54 years old (M = 23.38, SD = 7.63). Participants were required to be 
18 years or older and fluent in English.  
Design 
The current study was a face-to-face lab-based study. The study comprised two, 2 x 2 
mixed, experimental designs. The first 2 x 2 design had two cue utilisation typologies 
(higher, lower) as the between groups factor, and email condition (phishing, genuine) as the 
within-groups factor. Participants were classified with either higher or lower cue utilisation 
based on an assessment of cue utilisation within the context of cybersecurity. The dependent 
variable was performance in a phishing email task and a measure of subjective workload.  
The second 2 x 2 design had two anxiety typologies (high, low) as the between groups 
factor, and email condition (phishing, genuine) as the within-groups factor. Participants were 
classified with high and low levels of state and trait anxiety using an assessment that captured 
both state-trait anxiety. The dependent variable was performance in a phishing email task.  
Materials 
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to complete a series of 
demographic questions indicating their age, gender, time spent using a computer per day, 
confidence with computer use, level of English fluency, and number of emails received per 
day (see Appendix B).  
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Phishing Email Task (PET). As per the recommendations of Parsons et al. (2019), it 
was important to ensure that participants partaking in the current study were unaware that 
they were signing up for an experiment related to phishing email detection. This approach 
was taken to avoid subject expectancy bias. Indeed, previous research has found that if 
participants are informed they are involved in a phishing study they tend to err on the side of 
false alarms (classifying a legitimate email as phishing) rather than misses (classifying a 
phishing email as legitimate) (Lawson et al., 2017). To avoid priming participants as to the 
true nature of the study, participants were informed that they were electing to participate in a 
study on ‘how people manage their emails, and the factors that may affect email use’.  
An online experimental platform was used to deliver the novel phishing email task 
(PET) which was largely consistent with that described in Parsons et al. (2019). During the 
PET, participants were asked to read and respond to a randomised series of 21 emails (plus 
two practice emails); 14 genuine emails and 7 phishing emails. A greater number of genuine 
email stimuli, compared to phishing, was used in an effort to reflect real-world email 
correspondence (Parsons et al., 2019). All personal details within each email were modified 
to that of a fictitious individual with a gender-neutral name (i.e., Alex Jones). Participants 
were instructed that all emails were taken from the inbox of ‘Alex Jones’ and to assume that 
they were deliberately sent and of relevance to them. Participants were exposed to each email 
for 30 seconds after which they were automatically directed to answer the statement, ‘It is 
okay to click on the link in this email’. Participants selected the extent to which they agreed 
with the statement on a five-point Likert scale from 1(Strongly Disagree) to 5(Strongly 
Agree).  
 The nature of the emails used were adapted emails either found online or received by 
the researchers which all appeared to be sent from large national or international 
organisations. These emails were representative of the types of topics that would be expected 
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in a typical inbox as well as types of institutions commonly targeted for phishing attacks 
(Parsons et al., 2019), such as Australia Post, the Australian Federal Police, and Facebook. In 
line with Parsons et al. (2019), the series of emails were constructed using a direct 
manipulation of Cialdini’s (2007) social persuasion principles (i.e., authority, consistency, 
liking, reciprocity, scarcity and social proof). Of the 14 genuine emails that comprised this 
task, there were two emails that incorporated each of the six principles and two that were 
constructed with no social principle. Of the seven phishing emails that comprised this task, 
there was one email that incorporated each of the six principles and one that was constructed 
with no social principle. The distribution of social principles across the emails was in line 
with Parsons et al. (2019). Examples of emails used are provided in Appendix C.   
The only cue that an email was a ‘phish’ was the embedded link within the email text 
displayed next to a prompt button ‘Click Here’. During real-world email activity, individuals 
can hover over a prompt button to see the link associated with the prompt. However, the 
online experimental platform that was used in the current study was limited as such that 
displaying the link adjacent or below to the ‘Click Here’ button was the best alternative to 
this real-world experience. Emails created as ‘genuine’ showed a legitimate link taken from 
legitimate emails (e.g., a genuine email from National Crime Check included the link 
https://www.nationalcrimecheck.com.au/consumer/start_form), whereas emails created as 
‘phishing’ showed a link that had previously been included in a verified phishing email (e.g., 
a phishing email from the Australian Federal Police included the link http://www.dekorator-
sklep.pl/gen/cimb/index.htm) (see Figure 2). All phishing links were directly taken from 
Parsons et al. (2019) with permission.
















Figure 2. Example of Emails Used. Left: A genuine email, using the ‘authority’ social persuasion principle, with prompt button ‘Start the 
Process’ and corresponding adjacent link. Right: A phishing email, also using the ‘authority’ social persuasion principle, with prompt button 
‘Click here to access Infringement notice’ and corresponding link below.
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Manipulation checks. Two manipulation checks pertaining to the email stimuli were 
conducted. Manipulation check 1 aimed to assess whether the affiliated Cialdini (2007) social 
persuasion principles embedded within each email were recognised accordingly. 
Manipulation check 2 aimed to assess whether participants could discriminate between the 
genuine and phishing emails to ensure there were no ceiling or floor effects. This 
manipulation check was conducted as previous studies have found that individuals are quite 
naive in judging the legitimacy of a link, regardless of whether the email was phishing or 
genuine (Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010; Parsons et al., 2019).  
Both manipulation checks followed the same procedure. Specifically, they were 
conducted through an online experimental platform and took participants less than 20 
minutes to complete. Consistent with the main study, all participants were informed that they 
were taking part in a study on ‘how people manage their emails, and the factors that may 
affect email use’ and hence were not explicitly told they would be responding to phishing 
emails. Participants were recruited through social media announcements within the 
researchers’ networks and required to be fluent in English and be 18 years or older.  
Eleven participants were recruited for manipulation check 1. In line with the strategy 
by Parsons et al. (2019), participants were presented with definitions of each principle and 
asked to rank up to three principles that were most apparent in each email (see Appendix D 
for definitions).  Participants were also provided with a ‘no-principle’ option. For 18 of the 
21 emails, the principle that was most frequently selected to be most present, matched the 
intended principle. For example, for the emails that were manipulated to contain the ‘liking’ 
principle, ‘liking’ was ranked as the most present principle by 73% of participants; see full 
table of results in Appendix E. In two emails where the intended principle was not ranked as 
most present, participants still recognised the principle in their second or third rank. An 
amendment to one email was made, as its intended principle ‘consistency’ was not 
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recognised by participants (see Footnote 1). These results provided sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the emails that were manipulated to emulate a specific social persuasion 
principle were in fact perceived in line with their intended principle. 
Twelve participants were recruited for manipulation check 2. Participants were 
exposed to the 21 emails used in the main study for 30 seconds and on the subsequent screen 
asked to respond to the statement ‘It is okay to click on the link in this email’. Responses 
were measured on a five-point Likert scale from 1(Strongly disagree) to 5(Strongly Agree). 
On average, participants reported significantly lower ratings to click on the link of phishing 
emails (M = 2.00, SD = .72) compared to genuine emails (M = 3.72, SD = .52), t(11) = -6.42, 
p < .001, r = -.11. This was consistent across all principles of social persuasion except social 
proof; see full table of results in Appendix G. These results were sufficient enough to indicate 
that overall, individuals were able to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails. 
Railroad task. The use of a simulated railroad task was introduced as a concurrent, 
secondary task to increase cognitive workload while completing the PET. This task was 
completed simultaneously, but on a separate monitor (see Figure 3). The purpose of this 
secondary task was to maximise the cognitive resources needed to complete both tasks to a 
satisfactory level. This ensured that participants did not have enough time or cognitive 
resources available to use System 2 processing and analyse the email content in detail. This 
strategy ‘forced’ participants to activate System 1 processing and use any available cues 
related to phishing email detection. Participants were not told which task was the primary 
task and thus expected to allocate the necessary cognitive resources to complete each task 
satisfactorily.  




Figure 3. Experimental set up displaying the PET (Monitor 1: left) and the railroad task 
(Monitor 2: Right). 
The railroad task required participants to re-route trains that periodically required 
diversion, ensuring each train arrived at its appropriate destination. Four green railway tracks 
ran horizontally across the screen, each with an intersection to form ODD and EVEN 
endpoints (see Figure 4). The intersection was marked by a white portion of the track and 
indicated the point in which a diversion was required. The train was represented as a red line, 
which moved either from right to left of screen, or vice versa, allocated with a recurring 
three-digit number. Odd numbered trains were to arrive at endpoints labelled ‘ODD’, and 
even numbered trains were to arrive at endpoints labelled ‘EVEN’. If the train was on a 
misrouted track (i.e., an ODD train moving towards an EVEN endpoint), participants were 
required to click a grey icon, positioned adjacent to the intersection track, labelled ‘change’ 
to divert the train to its correct route. 




Figure 4. Simulated railroad task as viewed by participants. The green lines represent the railroad, while the red lines represent the train 
accompanied with either an EVEN or ODD number. For example, the top track has a train labelled with an EVEN number moving towards the 
left of screen; however, it is programmed to continue on the ODD track. Therefore, it requires diversion by clicking ‘change’ before reaching the 
white line intersection point.  
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The railroad task was set up so that every 7 seconds, a new train would enter the 
screen requiring a decision to be made by participants. Based on the duration of the PET, this 
task ran for 15 minutes to ensure participants did not complete this task prior to finishing the 
PET. This was consistent for all participants to keep workload controlled. 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). To measure state and trait anxiety, 
participants completed the STAI (Form Y; (Spielberger, 1983). The STAI uses two bipolar 
and unidimensional scales containing state–trait “anxiety present” items and state–trait 
“anxiety absent” items (Caci et al., 2003). This type of item pool is referred to as ‘balanced’ 
as items are polarised either towards anxiety or the opposite pole of anxiety. All items are 
self-reported on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1(Not at all) to 4(Very much so).  
The S-Anxiety scale consists of 20 self-report items, provided as short statements, 
with instructions “how you feel right now, at this moment”. Half of these items are worded 
positively to measure the absence of S-anxiety (e.g., “I feel calm”), whilst the other half are 
worded negatively to measure the presence of S-anxiety (e.g., “I feel tense”). This scale was 
designed to be sensitive to the conditions under which the test is administered (Spielberger, 
1983). The T-Anxiety scale also consists of 20 self-report items however are answered based 
on “how do you generally feel”. Seven of these items are worded positively to measure the 
absence of T-anxiety (e.g., “I feel pleasant”), whilst the remaining 13 are worded negatively 
to measure to presence of T-anxiety (e.g., “I worry too much over something that really 
doesn’t matter”). This scale is relatively impervious to conditions under which it is given, 
rather, capturing the personality trait of anxiety (Spielberger, 1983).  
EXPERT Intensive Skills Evaluation (EXPERTise 2.0). EXPERTise 2.0 (Wiggins, 
Loveday, & Auton, 2015) is a shell software package that can be customised to assess 
participants’ utilisation of cues during task-related activities within a specific domain. 
Typologies of behaviour that reflect higher or lower levels of cue utilisation are calculated, 
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the validity of which has been established in power control (Loveday, Wiggins, Harris, 
O'Hare, & Smith, 2013) and aviation decision making (Wiggins, Azar, Hawken, Loveday, & 
Newman, 2014). EXPERTise 2.0 has also demonstrated satisfactory test-retest reliability 
(Watkinson, Bristow, Auton, McMahon, & Wiggins, 2018).  
In the current study, participants completed the cybersecurity ‘edition’ of EXPERTise 
2.0, which comprises five tasks of domain-specific stimuli: Feature Identification Task, 
Feature Recognition Task, Feature Association Task, Feature Discrimination Task and the 
Feature Prioritisation Task. The EXPERTise 2.0 assessment was completed after the PET to 
ensure that the cybersecurity related stimuli did not prime participants to the true nature of 
the study.  
Feature Identification Task (FIT). Feature identification is based on the observation 
that experts are able to identify and utilise visual features in the environment that are more 
diagnostic of the system state compared to novices (Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, & Talleur, 
2008). In the FIT, participants are required to identify key features within a complex scene. 
The FIT presents participants with 16 incoming emails (including two practice trails) in a 
random order, each taken from the inbox of fictional individuals. Using a mouse, participants 
select the area of the email which they consider the greatest concern (e.g., a suspicious email 
address). Participants speed of response is recorded in milliseconds, with lower response 
latencies associated with higher cue utilisation (Loveday, Wiggins, & Searle, 2013). 
Feature Recognition Task (FRT). Feature recognition measures the accuracy in 
which participants can make a decision based on the recognition of critical features 
(Brouwers, Wiggins, & Griffin, 2018). In the FRT, participants are exposed to a series of 22 
emails (including two practice trials) for 1000 milliseconds. Participants must decide whether 
they think that the email is ‘trustworthy’, ‘untrustworthy’ or ‘impossible to tell’ from the 
information available to them in the short period of exposure. It is thought that greater 
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accuracy on this task is indicative of higher levels of cue utilisation (Brouwers, Wiggins, & 
Griffin, 2018). 
Feature Association Task (FAT). Feature association measures the extent to which 
participants are able to discriminate between relevant and less relevant associations between 
feature-event/object pairs (Wiggins et al., 2014). In the FAT, participants are shown 16 pairs 
of words presented for 1500 milliseconds (e.g., Email and Task). Using a 7-point Likert 
scale, participants are asked to indicate how related they perceive the words to be from 
1(extremely unrelated) to 7(extremely related). The mean variance is calculated, with a 
greater mean variance indicative of their capacity to distinguish related from unrelated 
features and events/object, and hence, higher cue utilisation (Wiggins et al., 2014).  
Feature Discrimination Task (FDT). Feature discrimination measures the capacity 
for individuals to discriminate between task-relevant and irrelevant features during a 
decision-making scenario. In the FDT, participants are presented with two email scenarios 
with information relating to a specific problem (e.g., A colleague is expecting a delivery). 
Based on the information presented within the email, participants must then select a 
subsequent course of action to take from a list of four (e.g., Ignore the Email). In addition, 
participants must rate the utility of the individual features within the email (e.g., ‘Date of 
email’ or ‘Location of purchase’) that influenced their decision using a 10-point Likert scale 
from 1(not important at all) to 10(extremely important). Ratings are aggregated to calculate a 
variance score, whereby greater variance is indicative of more discriminant ratings of utility 
between the cues in the scenario and hence, higher cue utilisation (Loveday, Wiggins, & 
Searle, 2013). 
Feature Prioritisation Task (FPT). Feature prioritisation is based on the finding that 
expert and novice operators vary in their approach taken to access task-relevant information 
in the initial assessment of a situation (Wiggins & O'Hare, 1995). Novice operators tend to 
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acquire information based on their visual presentation, whilst experts are more discriminating 
in their approach extracting information on their basis of relevance (Wiggins & O'Hare, 
1995). In the FPT, participants are presented with two incomplete email scenarios each with a 
small vignette (e.g., You have received an email from a colleague overseas). Participants are 
told that they can access further information pertinent to the scenarios from a list of 
dropdown tabs (see Figure 5). Participants are only given 30 seconds to access as much 
information as they deem necessary. After the time limit has elapsed, participants progress to 
a new page and asked, “How do you respond to this email?”. Higher cue utilisation is 
associated with a greater proportion of pairs of information tabs accessed in the sequence 
they are presented, calculated as the proportion of the total number of pairs of information 




























Figure 5. EXPERTise 2.0 Feature Prioritisation Task as viewed by participants.  
CUE UTILISATION AND ANXIETY ON PERFORMANCE                         
 
24 
NASA-Task Load Index (TLX). The NASA-TLX is a subjective measure of 
workload using a multidimensional rating scale with six bipolar dimensions of workload: 
mental demand; physical demand; temporal demand; own performance; effort; frustration 
(Hart & Staveland, 1988). An item for each dimension was administered (e.g., mental 
demand: “how high were the mental demands of the task?”; own performance: “how 
successful do you think you were in accomplishing the task?”). Apart from ‘own 
performance’, which is responded to using a scale from 1(not successful) to 7(successful), all 
other dimensions are measured from 1(low) to 7(high). This index was administered using 
paper-and-pencil (see Appendix H) immediately after participants completed the PET and 
railroad task. The NASA-TLX is one of the most widely used measurement tools to assess 
subjective workload in high-risk, time sensitive industries (Tubbs-Cooley, Mara, Carle, & 
Gurses, 2018).  
Procedure  
Ethics approval was obtained from the subcommittee in the School of Psychology at 
the University of Adelaide (Ref No: 19/41). Upon arrival, participants were briefed and 
directed to two adjacent computer monitors. On monitor 1, participants were required to read 
an online participant information form and provide electronic consent (see Appendix I). 
Participants then completed the demographic questionnaire, followed by the STAI. During 
this section of the task, the researcher remained outside of the room. Upon completion, 
participants were notified to alert the researcher, after which the PET was loaded on monitor 
1 and the railroad task was loaded on monitor 2. Instructions for the PET were displayed on 
screen in the pre-amble of the task, aided by an example (see Appendix J). Instructions for 
the railroad task were explained using standardised written instructions, with participants 
required to complete a 2-minute practice trial. Participants then commenced both tasks 
simultaneously on respective monitors (see Figure 6).  




Figure 6. Experimental set up of participant completing both tasks simultaneously (PET on 
monitor 1: left) and the railroad task on monitor 2: right). 
After completing the dual tasks, participants completed the paper-and-pencil version 
of the NASA-TLX. Participants then completed the EXPERTise 2.0 cue utilisation task 
battery on monitor 1. A debrief with participants took place immediately following the 
session to discuss any queries or concerns relating to the study. Experimental sessions took 






Figure 7. Experimental workflow of the current study.   
 




Overview of Analyses 
The primary aim of the current study was to examine whether two typologies of 
participants, categorised on the basis of cue utilisation, differed in their discrimination of 
phishing from genuine emails and also their perception of cognitive workload during this 
task. A secondary aim was to examine whether two typologies of participants, categorised on 
the basis of state and trait anxiety, differed in their discrimination of phishing from genuine 
emails. Data was analysed in two stages using IBM Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(Version 25). The first stage of analysis included establishing typologies of participants based 
on scores for the cue utilisation and anxiety measures to form the independent variables. The 
second stage of the analysis examined the hypotheses. 
Data Reduction  
Data pertaining to the EXPERTise 2.0 battery, the PET, the STAI, and the railroad task 
all underwent data reduction. The data reduction for the EXPERTise 2.0 tasks was consistent 
with the standard approach to the analysis of this data (Brouwers, Wiggins, Helton, O'Hare, 
& Griffin, 2016; Loveday, Wiggins, Harris, et al., 2013). For the Feature Identification Task, 
the mean response latency to identify the critical feature within the email was determined 
across the 16 scenarios. For the Feature Recognition Task, participants’ summed accuracy in 
identifying phishing emails was calculated across the 22 scenarios.  For the Feature 
Association Task, ratings of perceived association between feature-event pairs across the 16 
scenarios were combined into a single discrimination metric to reflect a mean variance score 
of participants’ responses. For the Feature Discrimination Task, the ratings of importance for 
each 10 features were recorded on a 10-point Likert scale, from 1(not important at all) to 
10(extremely important) and the mean of variance of these ratings was created for the two 
scenarios. The two mean variances were combined to form one mean. Finally, for the Feature 
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Prioritisation Task, the ratio of pairs of features that were selected in sequence, compared to 
the total number of pairs of features available, were recorded to form a mean ration for the 
two scenarios. 
Data reduction from the PET took place in two stages. Participants response to the 
statement ‘It is okay to click on the link in this email’ was considered for each email. In line 
with Parsons et al. (2019), a response of 1(Strongly disagree) was considered most 
appropriate when responding to a phishing email, and a response of 5(Strongly Agree) was 
considered most appropriate when responding to a genuine email. A response of 3(Neither 
Agree nor Disagree) was considered a neutral rating. In the first stage, a “click-ability” score 
for each email condition (genuine, phishing) was created as an average across the seven 
principles. Refer to Appendix K for a table summary of click-ability ratings for anxiety and 
cue utilisation typologies. 
In the second stage, a discrimination score was calculated for each participant which 
subtracted his/her average click-ability rating for phishing emails from genuine emails. 
Establishing a discrimination score ensured that the current hypotheses were appropriately 
analysed regarding the capacity of participants to discriminate between genuine and phishing 
emails. For example, if a participant’s average genuine click-ability score was 4.2, and their 
average phishing click-ability score was 1.3, their discrimination score would be 2.9. A 
greater, positive discrimination score indicated that the participant was better able to 
discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, compared to those with a lower 
discrimination score. While the stimuli were created in line with Cialdini’s (2007) social 
persuasion principles, an analysis of these principles, as seen in Parsons et al. (2019), was 
beyond the scope of this thesis.   
Data from State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was reduced consistent with Spielberger 
(1983) to form an added-weighted score for the S-Anxiety and the T-Anxiety scales. Using a 
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self-reported 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1(Not at all) to 4(Very much so), a rating of 4 
indicates a high level of anxiety for anxiety-present items, whilst a rating of 4 indicates a low 
level of anxiety for anxiety-absent items, (Spielberger, 1983). Scoring weights on anxiety-
present items remained the same, whilst the scoring weights on anxiety-absent items were 
reverse coded. The anxiety-absent items were provided by Spielberger (1983). For 
participants who omitted one or two items on either scale, the prorated full-scale score was 
obtained by determining the mean weighted score for items that the participant did respond, 
multiplied by 20. Total scores from each scale range between 20 and 80, with higher scores 
indicative of higher state/trait anxiety. 
Data reduction from NASA-TLX was consistent with the method used by Hart and 
Staveland (1988). After completing the PET and the railroad task, participants completed the 
NASA-TLX to measure the six bipolar dimensions of workload: mental demand; physical 
demand; temporal demand; own performance; effort; frustration. Apart from ‘own 
performance’, which was responded using a scale from 1(not successful) to 7(successful) 
all other dimensions were measured from 1(low) to 7(high). A final score was calculated as 
the mean rating from each of the six dimensions, with ‘own performance’ scores reverse 
coded. Final scores ranged from 0 to 7, where higher scores indicated higher perceived 
workload.  
Data from the railroad task was analysed separately for each participant. The aim of 
the railroad task was to impose additional cognitive resources to force participants to use cue 
associations while responding to the PET. Therefore, it was important to ascertain that each 
participant was at least attempting the task. Response rate on the task was measured as the 
amount of times participants attempted to divert a train. Of the 125 trains that were 
programmed to enter the tracks, 65 required diversion and 60 did not. All participants had a 
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response rate of 70% or more thus, it was clear that all participants were at least ascribing 
some cognitive resources to the secondary task.  
Data Analysis 
Stage 1: Establishing Typologies. 
Cue Utilisation. A k-means cluster analysis was conducted to determine whether 
participants could be categorised into two typologies representing higher and lower levels of 
cue utilisation within the domain of cybersecurity based on their performance across the five 
distinct tasks (Wiggins et al., 2014; Sturman, Wiggins, Auton, & Loft, 2019). Before the 
cluster analysis could be performed, scores for each task were converted to z-scores. The 
cluster analysis yielded two distinct typologies that broadly represented higher and lower 
levels of cue utilisation. Cluster 1 contained 16 participants who recorded relatively lower 
response latencies on the FIT, relatively greater accuracy on the FRT, relatively greater 
variance in the FAT and FDT, and a relatively lower ratio of sequential information accessed 
in the FPT. Overall, this pattern of performance across the EXPERTise 2.0 tasks  
was reflective of a relatively higher level of cue utilisation. The remaining 16 participants 
comprised the second typology who recorded the opposite pattern of responses across the five 
tasks which is consistent with performance associated with a lower level of cue utilisation. 
Table 1 summarises the results of the cluster analysis. 




Anxiety. To establish anxiety typologies, scores from the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory were used to categorise participants into three groups for both state and trait 
anxiety, which follows the methodology described in Harris and Cumming (2003). The 
typologies for state anxiety were categorised as follows: low anxiety comprised people with 
scores between 20 and 26 (n = 16), moderate anxiety comprised people with scores between 
37 and 45 (n = 7), and high anxiety comprised people with scores from 46 and higher (n = 9).  
The typologies for trait anxiety were categorised as follows: low anxiety comprised people 
with scores between 24 and 37 (n = 14), moderate anxiety comprised people with scores 
between 38 and 43 (n = 3), and high anxiety comprised people with scores 44 and higher (n = 
15). High and low typologies were only included in the data analysis to ensure participants 





Centroid Values for EXPERTise Task Clusters 
 Typology 
EXPERTise 2.0 Tasks (DV in brackets) 
Cluster 1 (Higher) 
(n = 16) 
Cluster 2 (Lower) 
(n = 16) 
Feature Identification Task (response latency) -.37 .37 
Feature Recognition Task (accuracy) .61 -.61 
Feature Association Task (variance) .29 -.28 
Feature Discrimination Task (variance) .41 -.41 
Feature Prioritisation Task (ratio) -.54 .54 
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Stage 2: Hypothesis Testing. 
H1: Participants could discriminate between genuine and phishing emails. To 
examine H1, a dependent samples t-test was conducted between the mean click-ability ratings 
of the two email conditions (phishing, genuine). A statistically significant result was evident 
between the mean click-ability ratings of genuine and phishing emails, t(31) = -5.53, p < 
.001, r = -.30. Providing support for H1, this result indicates that on average, participants 
were significantly less likely to consider it ‘okay’ to click on the link of phishing emails (M = 
2.31, SD = .87), compared to genuine emails (M = 3.64, SD = .82). 
H2. Participants with higher levels of cue utilisation will have a higher capacity to 
discriminate phishing emails from genuine emails, relative to those with lower levels of cue 
utilisation. To examine H2, a discrimination metric was used between participants click-
ability ratings for genuine and phishing emails. A higher discrimination score was indicative 
of a higher capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails (described in more 
detail above). Using an independent samples t-test, cue utilisation typology (high, low) was 
the between-groups factor, with discrimination score as the dependent variable. There was no 
main effect of cue utilisation typology on discrimination scores, F(1, 30) = .15, p = .62.  
Failing to support H2, this result suggests that there was no statistically significant difference 
in discrimination ability between phishing and genuine email for those with a higher (M = 
1.45, SD = 1.38), compared to those with a lower (M = 1.21, SD = 1.37) capacity for cue 
utilisation. Figure 8 summaries the discrimination scores for individuals categorised with 









Figure 8. This boxplot illustrates the discrimination scores for individuals with levels of high 
and low cue utilisation. Each box contains the middle 50% of scores for each cue utilisation 
typology, where the middle line represents the median value. The upper and lower whiskers 
represent the top and bottom 25% of scores, respectively. The error bars represent the 
maximum and minimum scores, respectively. ‘X’ represents the mean discrimination score. 
H3. Participants with higher levels of cue utilisation would perceive a phishing 
email task as less cognitive demanding, relative to those with lower levels of cue utilisation. 
To examine H3, an independent samples t-test was conducted with cue utilisation typology 
(high, low) as the independent variable, whilst score on the NASA-TLX was the dependent 
variable. There was no main effect of cue utilisation typology on perceived workload (p = 
.71). Failing to support H3, this result suggests that there was no statistically significant 
difference in perceived workload on the PET for those with a higher (M = 3.85, SD = 0.94), 
compared to those with a lower (M = 3.96, SD = 0.80) capacity for cue utilisation.  
H4a. Participants with higher levels of trait anxiety will have a lower capacity to 
discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, relative to those with lower levels of 
trait anxiety. To examine H3a, a discrimination metric was used between participants click-
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ability ratings for genuine and phishing emails. A higher discrimination score was indicative 
of a greater capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails. Using an 
independent samples t-test, trait anxiety typology (low, high) was the between-groups factor, 
whilst discrimination score was the dependent variable. A statistically significant between-
groups effect was evident for trait anxiety typology on discrimination scores, F(1, 28) = 4.32, 
p = .047. Providing support for H4a, this result suggests that individuals with high trait 
anxiety had a lower capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails (M = .88, 
SD = 1.28) compared to individuals with low trait anxiety (M = 1.88, SD = 1.30)  Figure 9 
summaries the discrimination scores for individuals categorised with levels of high and low 
trait anxiety.  
 
 
Figure 9. This boxplot illustrates the click-ability discrimination scores between phishing and 
genuine emails, for individuals with levels of high and low trait anxiety. Each box contains 
the middle 50% of scores for each trait anxiety typology, where the middle line represents the 
median value. The upper and lower whiskers represent the top and bottom 25% of scores, 
respectively. The error bars represent the maximum and minimum scores, respectively. ‘X’ 
represents the mean discrimination score. 
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H4b: Participants with higher levels of state anxiety will have a lower capacity to 
discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, relative to those with lower levels of 
state anxiety. To examine H4b, a discrimination metric was used between participants click-
ability ratings for genuine and phishing emails. A higher discrimination score was indicative 
of a greater capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails. Using an 
independent samples t-test, state anxiety typology (low, high) was the between-groups factor, 
whilst click-ability discrimination score was the dependent variable. There was no main 
effect of state anxiety typology on discrimination scores, F(1, 23) = .17, p = .33. Failing to 
support H3b, this result suggests that there was no statistically significant difference in 
discrimination ability between phishing and genuine email for individuals with high state 
anxiety (M = 1.00, SD = 1.43) compared to individuals with low state anxiety (M = 1.59, SD 
= 1.44). Figure 10 summaries the discrimination scores for individuals categorised with 
levels of high and low state anxiety. 
 
Figure 10. This boxplot illustrates the click-ability discrimination scores between phishing 
and genuine emails, for individuals with levels of high and low state anxiety. Each box 
contains the middle 50% of scores for each state anxiety typology, where the middle line 
represents the median value. The upper and lower whiskers represent the top and bottom 25% 
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of scores, respectively. The error bars represent the maximum and minimum scores, 
respectively. ‘X’ represents the mean discrimination score. 
Discussion 
Overview 
The current study aimed to examine the individual differences of cue utilisation and 
state/trait anxiety and their association with phishing email susceptibility. The study further 
aimed to explore the effect of cue utilisation on subjective mental workload, which was yet to 
be explored in the context of a phishing email study. Overall, the findings from this study 
suggest that participants were significantly more likely to consider a link ‘okay’ to click on 
when viewing genuine emails, compared to phishing emails, providing support for H1. 
However, the only significant finding relating to individual differences was trait anxiety, 
indicating that individuals with higher levels of trait anxiety had a lower capacity to 
discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, compared to their less anxious 
counterparts. 
Cue Utilisation and Phishing Susceptibility (H2) 
According to Brunswik’s (1955) Lens Model, making sense of a given situation is 
guided by the cues present in the environment and the meaning of those cues to the 
individual. This model assumes that individuals recognise a situation as typical by matching 
the cues in the current situation with a situation resident in LTM. Behaviour is thus guided by 
the cues in which an individual can identify to better anticipate and engage in a situation. 
Therefore, in the context of the current study, those with a higher capacity for cue utilisation 
were expected to have a greater capacity to discriminate between phishing and genuine 
emails in a novel phishing email task, compared to those with a lower capacity for cue 
utilisation (H2). However, this hypothesis was not supported; specifically, it was found that 
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having a higher capacity for cue utilisation did not give participants an advantage when 
discriminating phishing from genuine emails.  
This result was surprising considering the use of the secondary task, alongside the 
phishing email task, was designed to ‘force’ participants to engage in cue-based reasoning as 
the dual task condition was intended to limit cognitive resources. As such, it was expected 
that those who had cue associations pertaining to phishing email detection in LTM would be 
able to apply them during the task to facilitate superior performance. In comparison, those 
participants who did not possess such cue associations, would not be able to engage in fast 
and automatic processes to assess the emails and hence, would not perform as well.  
However, as there was only one cue of “phishiness” within the email stimuli (a link), 
it is possible that all participants were generally good at picking up on this cue. Indeed, H1 
showed that in general, participants were able to discriminate between genuine and phishing 
emails. Therefore, future studies should perhaps look at more sophisticated phishing emails 
that then might tease out the difference between high and low cue utilisation. 
Subjective Workload and Cue Utilisation (H3) 
While an increase in task demands involves an increase in cognitive demands, cue 
utilisation is thought to reduce the number of task-related elements that need to be processed 
(Brouwers et al., 2017). Therefore, it was hypothesised that participants with higher levels of 
cue utilisation would perceive the phishing email task as less cognitive demanding, relative to 
those with lower levels of cue utilisation (H3). The findings did not support this hypothesis as 
the task was perceived as having the same level of workload for both low and high cue 
utilisation typologies. It is suggested that this result is due to the outcomes in H2, in that 
participants with high and low cue utilisation equally possessed the capacity to associate the 
email link with email discriminability. As a result, neither group had to evoke System 2 
processing, supporting the finding that both typologies found the task equally challenging.  
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Alternatively, Brouwers et al. (2017) proposed that such a finding could be due to a 
dissociation between perceived workload and performance under dual task conditions. 
Dissociations between subjective measures of workload and performance often occur when 
the competition for resources results in distorted self-report estimates of workload (Yeh and 
Wickens, 1998 cited in Brouwers et al., 2017). Perception of workload thus becomes reliant 
on perceived success, rather than the fidelity of workload required across both tasks. 
Arguably, as there was no difference in performance across participants with high and low 
cue utilisation, both groups could have perceived similar outcomes of success.  
Anxiety and Phishing Susceptibility (H4a and H4b) 
Due to the processing bias towards threat-related information of individuals with high 
levels of anxiety (Hartley & Phelps, 2012), this study hypothesised that participants with high 
levels of trait (H4a)/state (H4b) anxiety would have a lower capacity to discriminate between 
genuine and phishing emails, relative to those with low levels of state/trait anxiety.  
In support of H4a, results indicated that individuals with high trait anxiety had a lower 
capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, compared to their less anxious 
counterparts. This finding suggests that participants with high trait anxiety erred on the side 
of caution, even when responding to a genuine email. Such a response is consistent with the 
underlying mechanisms of the Attention Control Theory which postulates that anxious 
individuals have a tendency to negatively frame stimuli, even at the cost of missing potential 
gains (Hartley & Phelps, 2012). This finding has practical implications, discussed in the 
latter. 
While there was a relationship found with trait anxiety and email discriminability, this 
result was not replicated with state anxiety, failing to support H4b. Specifically, individuals 
with high state anxiety were no different in their capacity to discriminate between genuine 
and phishing emails compared to individuals with low state anxiety. Two possible 
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explanations can account for this incongruent finding. The first explanation relates to the way 
in which state anxiety was measured. Despite administering the assessment of state anxiety 
directly prior to the commencement of the dual tasks, the conditions under which it was 
administered were considerably mild and non-threatening in comparison. Indeed, as state 
anxiety is sensitive to the current conditions an individual is in, (Spielberger, 1983) state 
anxiety levels may have changed whilst completing the dual tasks. Therefore, participants 
state anxiety under cognitively demanding conditions may not have been accurately captured. 
This explanation is not warranted for H4a, as trait anxiety is more inherent and relatively 
stable across conditions. 
The second explanation relates to whether state anxiety was a derivative of the task 
itself. In threatening environments, the state of anxiety encourages a self-protective framing 
of problems to avoid large losses (Matthews, Panganiban, & Hudlicka, 2011). However, for 
this ‘framing’ to occur, the paradigm of the task itself must be considered threatening. On the 
basis that H4b was not supported, this suggests that individuals categorised with high state 
anxiety were no more affected by the conditions of the task compared to those with low state 
anxiety. Therefore, state anxiety was not a task-specific outcome.   
Implications of the Findings 
The outcomes of this study help in the understanding of phishing email detection, 
which aims to assist future training and/or campaigns. Whilst it was recognised that on 
average individuals could discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, this was on the 
basis of only one cue (a link). Accordingly, it is assumed that using a cue to establish email 
discriminability is a relatively frugal task, even under cognitively demanding conditions. 
However, as phishing emails are becoming more sophisticated in their disguise, it is 
encouraged that future studies investigate into other, more nuanced cues (e.g., email 
greetings). This can be achieved by embedding a range of cues in the email stimuli to 
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determine what cues individuals use to better discriminate between genuine and phishing 
emails. This would provide extensive findings to form training and/or campaigns.   
However, while campaigns on phishing emails may help raise awareness about this 
cybersecurity threat, it is recommended that future training focus on improving phishing 
discrimination rather than simply biasing people towards more risk-adverse behaviour 
(Parsons et al., 2019). This is pertinent considering the current findings highlight that 
individuals with an attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli (i.e., high trait anxiety) had 
a lower capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails. This can be 
detrimental to work/life productively if everything is deemed as suspicious. For example, 
incorrectly identifying a phishing email can result in an individual missing out on valuable or 
useful information, or, from an organisational perspective, affect customer trust and 
reputation (Parsons et al., 2019).  
Strengths 
The design of the current study sought to maximise cognitive resources using a dual 
task condition to induce participants to rely on cues to assess emails. Adopting this design 
strengthened the applicably of the findings to real-world settings, as individuals are often 
having conversations, looking at their phone, or engaging in other work whilst reading 
emails.   
Another strength of the study was that it was lab-based. Often phishing studies are 
administered online, lending themselves to a number of uncontrolled variances in 
experimental conditions. However, as the current study was administered face-to-face, this 
ensured the experimental conditions were consistent across participants. In addition, this was 
an inaugural study investigating the individual differences of cue utilisation and anxiety in 
the context of phishing email susceptibility. This research forms a foundation for future 
research. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
The current study was not without limitations. First and foremost, the study was 
limited in sample size. This limited statistical power and potentiality for main effects and 
interactions relating to phishing susceptibility. It is recommended that the study be replicated 
to obtain a larger sample. 
 Using a role-play design, participants were to assume that all emails were of relevance 
to ‘Alex Jones’. This may have disoriented participants in their appraisal of each email. 
Parsons et al. (2019) recognised that the appeal or click-ability of emails are much more 
effective if they reflect a real ongoing relationship. To address this limitation, Parsons et al. 
(2019) suggested future research target a specific university or organisation and present them 
with a series of genuine and phishing emails which are targeted directly at them (e.g., an 
email distributing an online student newsletter). In this context, the likelihood of appeal to 
existing relations could better represent an individual’s phishing susceptibility (Parsons et al., 
2019). Furthermore, while the statement ‘It is okay to click on the link in this email’ was used 
as an indirect measure of phishing susceptibility, this could have primed participants to more 
cautious behaviour. In real life email correspondence, susceptibility to phishing emails may 
be higher. It is suggested that future research use a statement less likely to prime participants, 
such as ‘would you follow up with this email?’.  
According to Kumaraguru et al. (2010) users are unlikely to spend a considerable 
amount of time engaging in security-related tutorials. Therefore, in future studies regarding 
phishing susceptibility, a more interactive methodology is recommended using learning-by-
doing or immediate feedback tasks (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). For example, individuals will 
be provided with immediate feedback if they incorrectly judge a genuine email as phishing, 
or a phishing email as genuine. This aims to guide individuals towards correct behaviour and 
the reduction of unproductive behaviour. 




 The current study aimed to further understand how the individual differences of cue 
utilisation capacity and state/trait anxiety influence phishing email susceptibility. Higher trait 
anxiety was associated with a lower capacity to discriminate between phishing and genuine 
emails, presumably due to an attentional bias to threat-related stimuli. However, this 
relationship was not evident for state anxiety. No associations were evident between cue 
utilisation typology and phishing email susceptibility, and subjective mental workload.  
 Overall, this research makes a meaningful contribution to the combined literature of 
individual differences and phishing susceptibility. As phishing attacks continue to become 
more frequent and sophisticated, future research needs to continue to examine those most at 
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1 The subject line of the email was modified to include a stronger presence of the 
consistency principle (see Appendix F). As a result, 100% of the participants (n = 5) recruited 
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Appendix B: Demographic questionnaire. 
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Appendix C: Example of Emails. 
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Consistency (genuine) and Consistency (phishing) Emails   
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Appendix D: Social Persuasion Definitions and Rating Scale 
Reciprocity Principle: This principle is based on the idea that individuals will feel obliged to 
return the favour/repay a service for one previously received. For example, clothing 
companies will offer an online point system to customers to generate gratitude so that 
customers will continue to shop there. 
Consistency Principle: This principle is based on the idea that individuals will seek to 
honour their commitments and remain consistent with their words and actions. For example, 
reminding an individual that they previously used an online service, to increase the chances 
of them using that service again. 
Social Proof Principle: This principle is based on the idea that people tend to mimic the 
behaviours of others. For example, an individual is more likely to fill out a customer survey if 
informed that 90% of customers have already taken the time to complete it. 
Likeability Principle: This principle is based on the idea that people will be more easily 
persuaded by someone they like or find credible. For example, an individual is more likely to 
comply with a request to ‘check out the latest offers’ from an online store that praises their 
customers. 
Authority Principle: This principle is based on the idea that people have a tendency to 
follow a request by someone of authority or in a position of power. For example, an 
individual is more likely to comply with an email request sent by the boss rather than a 
subordinate. 
Scarcity Principle: This principle is based on the idea that when an individual is given a 
restricted time frame to act, there will be less reasoning involved in the final decision. For 
example, an individual is more likely to purchase online tickets to an event if tickets are only 
available for another 24 hours 
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Appendix E: Manipulation Check 1 Results. 
 
 
Note. * Emails with their intended principle listed as either second or third highest ranked principle, **Results after email was amended due to intended principle not be recognised by 
participants
Top 3 Ranked Principles for Each Email   
Email Highest Ranked Principle (%) Second Highest Ranked Principle (%) Third Highest Ranked Principle (%) 
Phishing 1 Scarcity Scarcity (82%) No Principle, Authority & Consistency (27%) No Principle (36%) 
Phishing 2 Social Proof Social Proof (55%) Social Proof (45%) No Principle & Liking (36%) 
Phishing 3 Authority Authority (100%) Scarcity (55%) No Principle (55%) 
Phishing 4 Liking Liking (73%) No Principle (64%) No Principle (82%) 
Phishing 5 Reciprocity Reciprocity (100%) Consistency (36%) Liking (36%) 
Phishing 6 Consistency Consistency (73%) Social Proof (37%) Liking & Scarcity (27%) 
Phishing 7 No Principle* Authority (64%) No Principle (45%) No Principle (73%) 
Genuine 1 Scarcity Scarcity (100%) Consistency (36%) No Principle (36%) 
Genuine 2 Scarcity Scarcity (91%) Consistency (65%) No Principle (45%) 
Genuine 3 Social Proof  Social Proof (64%) Authority (27%) No Principle (55%) 
Genuine 4 Social Proof Social Proof (100%) No Principle & Liking (36%) No Principle (73%) 
Genuine 5 Authority Authority (64%) No Principle (36%) No Principle (55%) 
Genuine 6 Authority Authority (55%) No Principle (55%) No Principle (64%) 
Genuine 7 Liking* Consistency (45%) Reciprocity (64%) Liking (36%) 
Genuine 8 Liking Liking (55%) Social Proof (27%) No Principle (36%) 
Genuine 9 Reciprocity Reciprocity (91%) Consistency (55%) No Principle (45%) 
Genuine 10 Reciprocity Reciprocity (36%) Reciprocity & Consistency (27%) No Principle (36%) 
Genuine 11 Consistency** Consistency (100%) No Principle (55%) No Principle 73%) 
Genuine 12 Consistency Consistency (36%) Liking (36%) No Principle (55%) 
Genuine 13 No Principle* Scarcity & Consistency (27%) No Principle (36%) No Principle (64%) 
Genuine 14 No Principle  No Principle (36%) No Principle (45%) No Principle (73%) 
CUE UTILISATION AND ANXIETY ON PERFORMANCE                         
 
59 















CUE UTILISATION AND ANXIETY ON PERFORMANCE                         
 
60 
Appendix G: Manipulation Check 2 Results. 
Paired Sample T-Test Between Type of Social Persuasion Principle and Phishing/Genuine Email ‘click-ability’ ratings 
Persuasion Principle Email Type M (SD) Mean Difference (SD) t p 
Scarcity Phishing 1.83 (1.40) -1.96 (1.42) -4.77 .001 
Genuine 3.79 (0.84) 
Social Proof Phishing 2.42 (1.16) -.63 (1.28) -1.69 .119 
Genuine 3.04 (.99) 
Authority Phishing 1.42 (.67) -2.04 (1.01) -7.00 .000 
Genuine 3.46 (.78) 
Liking Phishing 2.50 (1.51) -1.25 (1.63) -2.66 
 
.022 
Genuine 2.75 (.62) 
Reciprocity Phishing 1.83 (1.34) -2.04 (1.53) -4.62 .001 
Genuine 3.88 (.77) 
Consistency Phishing 2.33 (1.44) -1.88 (1.55) -4.18 .002 
Genuine 4.21 (.86) 
No Principle Phishing 1.67 (1.15) -2.25 (1.39) -5.61 .000 
Genuine 3.92 (.73) 
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Appendix J: Instruction page for the PET
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Mean and Standard Deviation for Typologies of State and Trait Anxiety. 
Email Condition 
Low Moderate High 
State Trait State Trait State Trait 
Genuine Email 3.89 (.69) 3.97 (.73) 3.62 (.51) 3.62 (.15) 3.21 (.82) 3.34 (.88) 
Phishing Email 2.30 (.96) 2.09 (.83) 2.49 (1.06) 2.62 (1.38) 2.20 (.87) 2.46 (.82) 
Mean and Standard Deviation for Typologies of Cue Utilisation 
Email Condition Low  High  
Genuine Email 3.38 (.85) 3.90 (.71) 
Phishing Email 2.18 (.77) 2.45 (.96) 
